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We present a simplified model for the exploitation of finite resources by interacting agents, where
each agent receives a random fraction of the available resources. An extremal dynamics ensures that
the poorest agent has a chance to change its economic welfare. After a long transient, the system
self-organizes into a critical state that maximizes the average performance of each participant. Our
model exhibits a new kind of wealth condensation, where very few extremely rich agents are stable
in time and the rest stays in the middle class.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Da, 45.70.Ht, 05.65.+b
Extended systems showing critical behavior do not
need any fine-tuning of a parameter to be in a critical
state. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Bak, Tang
and Wiesenfeld introduced the concept of self–organized
criticality (SOC) [1]. In the critical state, there are long-
range interactions, by which each part of the system feels
the influence of all the others. More precisely, this means
that many of the relevant observables in the system fol-
low a power–law or Pareto–Le´vy distribution with a non-
trivial exponent.
Economics is, by far, one of the more complex extended
systems. Economic development has always been consid-
ered the driving (or relevant) force in determining the
relationships inside a society. Similar to what happens
in paleontology [2], it follows a punctuated pattern: Wars,
famines, revolutions (and counter-revolutions) are the
most evident (and extreme) illustrations of these bursts
of historical activity. It is then natural, if nothing else by
the force of mere analogy, to look for evidences of critical
behavior in economic systems.
In this paper we will concentrate on one particular as-
pect of economic processes. In recent years a great deal
of effort has been devoted to the analysis of economic
data. From stock–exchange fluctuations [3], models of
production [4], size distribution of companies [5], to the
appearance of money [6], and the effects of controls on the
market [7], it has finally been shown that market econ-
omy exhibits properties characteristic of a critical system
[8].
Here we aim at modeling the competition among differ-
ent agents (countries, enterprises, etc.) acting in an envi-
ronment with constant resources. For this reason, we call
the present model TWC-model (Total Wealth Conserved
model). This restriction has several motivations. On the
one hand, it can be argued that our planet is finite and
consequently the resources in it are finite. Even though
there are resources that are actually renewable, we as-
sume that those are renewed at the expense of others,
thus making the totality of available resources constant.
On the other hand any study of wealth increase requires
understanding the behavior of the reference (conserva-
tive) system.
We will model our economy as a one-dimensional lat-
tice, every site of which represents an agent. Agents with
closer ties to each other (geographical or otherwise) will
be neighbors on the lattice. For simplicity sake we as-
sume periodic boundary conditions. Each agent will be
characterized by some wealth-parameter that represents
its welfare. The exact choice of this parameter is not
straightforward. For instance, if we are thinking of coun-
tries in the world economy the GDP, GNP or some func-
tion of macroeconomic indicators could be a reasonable
choice. In the case of companies, equity, share price or
some combination of them with outstanding debt are rea-
sonable candidates. We choose an initial configuration
where the wealth is distributed randomly among agents,
the wealth of each agent being between 0 and 1.
In the marketplace, all agents strive to improve their
situation. In particular the poorest agent is the one feel-
ing the strongest pressure to move up the ladder. Thus,
we model this process by an extremal dynamics. At each
time step, the poorest country, i.e. the one with the
minimum wealth, will take some action to improve its
economic state. That is, it will change its production
methods, borrow money, increase the percentage of sown
fields or take some other measure aiming at increasing its
wealth. Since the outcome of any such measure is uncer-
tain, we model this outcome as a random change in the
wealth parameter of this country. Moreover, whatever
wealth is gained (lost) by the poorest agent will be at the
expense of its neighbors and we assume it to be equally
divided among its two nearest neighbors. We would like
to remark that, apart from conservation, we do not im-
pose any limit on the wealth evolution, so negative values
are possible, corresponding to agents having debt rather
than wealth. Since a site with negative wealth will most
probably be the minimum in the near future, we expect
such a site to linger only a few steps in red. In this
2simplified version of the model, default is not taken into
account, that is, any company may stay for ever in debt,
albeit with a very low probability.
After a relatively long transient the system arrives at
a stationary wealth distribution; one typical image of the
wealth’s landscape is shown in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1: Distribution of wealth. The plots show the probabil-
ity distribution P (x) for the model with interactions to near-
est neighbors (full line) and with global interactions (dashed
line). In both cases the number of agents is N = 1000. The
histograms were built using 105 consecutive states, after a
transient of 106 steps has elapsed.
As in other extremal dynamics models the system self-
organizes into a state in which almost all agents are be-
yond a certain threshold, ηT ≈ 0.4. Above threshold, the
distribution of agents is exponential, i.e. there are expo-
nentially few rich agents while the mass of them remain
in what we call a middle class. Wealth redistribution is
then evident.
Turning our attention back to Fig. 1, we show also
the globally coupled (mean field) solution, corresponding
to a random choice of sites from which wealth is taken
or given to. This mean field solution exhibits a lower
threshold and, more strikingly, an almost linear behavior
beyond threshold. This departs from standard extremal
dynamics models where both distributions are rather uni-
form. Furthermore, the distribution of avalanches follows
a power law with the same exponent as the Bak-Sneppen
universality class.
In Fig. 2a we show the temporal evolution, in the SOC
state, of the position of the systems minimum and maxi-
mum wealth. We can see that, while the site of minimum
wealth is changing continuously, generating avalanches of
wealth redistribution among neighbors, the richest site
is stable over long periods of time. Indeed, when af-
fected by an avalanche it can recover its status after a
short time. These brief interruptions, usually produced
by short-lived avalanches, are reflected as gaps in the
maxima lines.
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FIG. 2: (a) Time evolution of the positions of the maximum
(circles) and minimum (triangles) wealth. (b) Number of time
steps, n, that a given agent has had the maximum wealth.
The results presented in this figure correspond to 104 time
steps after a transient of 2× 105 time steps.
In Fig. 2b we present the statistics of the number of
time-steps a site spends as absolute maximum. Clearly
only a few agents have spent most of the time as maxima,
while the rest lurks somewhere in the middle class. We
have also observed that not only the absolute maximum
is stable, but also a privileged group, whose wealth is
around the same value of the maximum, remains in its
prosperous position for quite a while. The composition
and hierarchy of this privileged group is barely affected
by the avalanches that produce the abovementioned gaps.
So far we have focused our attention on the final state
of the economy, that is, on the wealth distribution in
the self-organized state. Let us now devote some time
to discuss the transient. In particular, we are interested
in understanding the process of wealth accumulation. In
Fig. 3 we show the time evolution of Nη, the fraction of
the agents whose wealth x(t) < η, for different values of
η. Slowly but steadily, for values of η ≤ ηT these fractions
decrease, thus showing the speed of wealth redistribution
in the system. As expected, the higher the value of η,
the slower the progress. As can be clearly seen in the
picture, all fractions with η ≤ ηT converge to zero, while
3for η > ηT the fraction grows quickly to its asymptotic
value. When the value of η is near 1, the fraction quickly
converges to 1, reflecting the existence of small privileged
groups. We have also observed that the probability of one
agent becoming wealthier in a time step decreases as time
goes by, to finally converge to a finite value, p ≈ 0.76.
Both effects are a consequence of the fact that the total
wealth to be distributed is finite.
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FIG. 3: The fraction of the system whose state is below x = η,
Nη(t), is displayed as a function of time, for selected values
of η, as shown in the legend. In all cases N = 10000.
From these results several conclusions may be drawn.
First and foremost, resource conservation leads to an
exponential wealth distribution, where the very few ex-
tremely rich agents are stable in time and the rest is just
above threshold. This is tantamount to saying that the
invisible hand [12] of redistribution works only among the
middle class. Neither trade nor cost of debt, returns or
tax on wealth is explicitly included in this model. This
reinforces the role played by geography. As can be seen
in Fig. 1, the a-geographic mean field solution generates
a completely different wealth distribution. Indeed, this
globally coupled solution can be compared with the re-
sults obtained in Refs. [9, 10] for stochastic multiplicative
market models, and reinforces the conclusions presented
in Ref. [11] concerning wealth condensation with a finite
number of agents. Secondly, the economic progress in
society is steady, even if slow.
At this point it is instructive to compare these results
with Pareto’s law [13], which suggests that individual
wealth follows a power law distribution. Our model ex-
hibits exponential distribution in the local limit and a
particular power law distribution (with an exponent close
to one) in the mean field limit. As explained above, the
later case corresponds to global interactions, and in this
case there is also a higher number of poorer agents, be-
cause the threshold is much lower than in the local in-
teraction case. In brief, power laws seem to be a conse-
quence of globalization in the market and favor a wide
spectrum of wealth distribution, i.e. increase inequalities.
In a sense, our local model corresponds to a kind of feu-
dal world, where local barons maintain their dominance
for long periods of time.
Summarizing, the model presented here provides a sim-
ple description of wealth redistribution in the early stages
of human economic history, and indicates some of the
possible driving forces beyond the market expansions
that influenced this redistribution process. We believe
these conclusions may be of interest in view of the present
debate over the goods and evils of globalization.
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